Predictive Cyber Situational Awareness and Personalized Blacklisting: A Sequential Rule Mining Approach by Husák Martin et al.
19
Predictive Cyber Situational Awareness and Personalized
Blacklisting: A Sequential Rule Mining Approach
MARTIN HUSÁK,Masaryk University
TOMÁŠ BAJTOŠ, Pavol Jozef Šafárik University in Košice
JAROSLAV KAŠPAR,Masaryk University
ELIAS BOU-HARB, University of Texas at San Antonio
PAVEL ČELEDA,Masaryk University
Cybersecurity adopts data mining for its ability to extract concealed and indistinct patterns in the data,
such as for the needs of alert correlation. Inferring common attack patterns and rules from the alerts helps
in understanding the threat landscape for the defenders and allows for the realization of cyber situational
awareness, including the projection of ongoing attacks. In this paper, we explore the use of data mining,
namely sequential rule mining, in the analysis of intrusion detection alerts. We employed a dataset of 12
million alerts from 34 intrusion detection systems in 3 organizations gathered in an alert sharing platform,
and processed it using our analytical framework. We execute the mining of sequential rules that we use to
predict security events, which we utilize to create a predictive blacklist. Thus, the recipients of the data from
the sharing platform will receive only a small number of alerts of events that are likely to occur instead of a
large number of alerts of past events. The predictive blacklist has the size of only 3 % of the raw data, and
more than 60% of its entries are shown to be successful in performing accurate predictions in operational,
real-world settings.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the cybersecurity field started to adopt data mining for its ability to extract concealed
and indistinct patterns in the data for various requirements, including alert correlation [3]. Inferring
common attack patterns and rules from the alerts helps in understanding the threat landscape for
the defenders and allows for achieving cyber situational awareness (CSA) [27] in all three of its
stages, namely perception, comprehension, and projection [11]. Perceiving the security situation
via intrusion detection systems (IDS) and comprehending cyber attacks via alert correlation allows
for the projection of ongoing attacks and prediction of upcoming security events. This article
builds foundations from our previous work, in which we tackled various related topics, such as
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method selection [20], long-term observations [18], and system design [19]. Herein, we present
further explorations within such fields and shed light on lessons learned towards the utmost goal
of achieving attack projections and building predictive blacklisting capabilities.
Nowadays, data-driven curation and analysis related to intrusion detection alerts could be
considered as big data problems due to their volume, variety, and velocity. This is especially
apparent in collaborative intrusion detection and information exchange settings [43]. Searching
for interesting pieces of information in such distributed data has become complicated for human
analysts and, thus, there is a need to investigate machine-supported analytics and systems towards
this goal. Raw data is impractical to use in incident response; the number of IP addresses and other
network entities is too large to employ them in a blacklist or as firewall rules. In order to make use
of intrusion detection alerts at large, there is a need to select a smaller amount of network entities
that are likely to continue with malicious activities against particular targets. We typically refer
to such attempts as predictive or personalized blacklisting, and we believe that the methods of
unsupervised data mining could be used to achieve such goals.
To this end, we state that the main motivation for this work is to distill a small and highly
actionable set of network entities from large volumes of alerts generated from heterogeneous and
distributed sources. In this context, we propose to achieve this goal via personalized and predictive
blacklisting. Namely, we have to:
• Analyze the data from an alert sharing platform using preferably an unsupervised data mining
approach, which does not require significant human interaction or expert input.
• Predict the continuation of running attacks so that we may estimate future malicious actors.
• Distill a predictive blacklist that contains expected future malicious actors.
• Personalize the blacklist so that recipients receive only the list of malicious actors that are
expected to threaten them.
To this end, in this article, we propose an approach based on sequential rule mining to infer
knowledge from intrusion detection alerts and use it to create personalized and predictive blacklists.
Our work is motivated by the needs of the alert sharing platform SABU [6], which is operated
in national research and education network (CESNET), and distributes alerts from various IDS
and honeypots located in multiple geographically and organizationally distributed networks. We
use AIDA [21], an alert processing framework that exploits techniques of stream data processing
and data mining over the alerts [19]. The AIDA framework is capable of mining sequential rules
for use in predicting upcoming security events. The predicted events can then be used to create a
blacklist of IP addresses that are likely to persist with malicious activity. Further, our approach also
predicts the location of the upcoming security events, which allows for personalized blacklisting
for particular organizations participating in information exchange within the SABU platform. The
contributions of the paper can be summarized as follows:
• We propose a unique combination of information sharing, data mining, and predictive analysis
to address an important, applied problem. Specifically, we illustrate the use of the Top-K
sequential rule mining [16] in the analysis of intrusion detection alerts in the SABU sharing
platform [6]. The results can be directly employed as predictive rules for predicting upcoming
security events. We show that the data mining outputs are mostly stable over time and that
the predictions leave enough time for the defenders to react to predicted security events.
• We explore the idea of predictive and personalized blacklisting, a novel approach that has
highly practical impacts on operational networks. We outline the process of generating
predictive and personalized blacklists from the predicted events. Our results show that the
predictive blacklist can be significantly smaller than a blacklist made of raw data and achieves
the success rate of over 60 % in predicting security events.
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• We illustrate the use of new and up-to-date datasets and operational tools, such as the AIDA
framework [21] and the anonymized, publicly available dataset [24] of alerts from the SABU
platform [6], to allow for the reproducibility of our research.
The remainder of this paper is organized into five sections. Section 2 presents the related work
on sharing intrusion detection alerts, their correlation, and predictive analysis. Section 3 introduces
the SABU platform, from which the input data was obtained, and the AIDA framework that we
used for processing the data. Section 4 presents the experimental setup and results. Discussion of
the results and comparison to related work is presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper
and pinpoints a few topics for future work.
2 RELATEDWORK
Background to our work consists of three main parts. First, set our work in the context of collabo-
ration and information exchange in cybersecurity and alert correlation. Second, we summarize
related work on attack prediction supported by data mining, which paves the way to our proposed
approach. Third, we summarize related work on predictive blacklisting, which shares similar goals
as our work. The most substantial related work is summarized in Table 1.
Collaboration and information exchange has become a substantial part of the cybersecurity
practice, from the cooperation between IDS [43] to nation-wide information sharing [37]. Research
and development have focused on automating the process so that timely and important pieces of
information would be exchanged to provide early warning [35], increase the precision of intrusion
detection, or simply to announce a threat. The task of alert correlation [9] is to put together
corresponding alerts, find relations between alerts, reconstruct the progress of an attack, and also
to recognize the intent of an attacker while analyzing the impact of potential security incidents.
The detailed tasks and processes of security alert correlation were initially proposed by Valeur et
al. [42]. Briefly, the alerts from sensors need to be normalized, fused (aggregated), and verified first.
Subsequently, the attack session can be reconstructed for the purposes of attack aim recognition,
multi-stage attack correlation, and impact analysis [42]. Cuppens and Miège [7] discussed the
problem from the perspective of collaborative intrusion detection, and Elshoush et al. [10] surveyed
methods of alert correlation in a collaborative environment. In recent years, alert correlation is
often supported by data mining [3]. A review of particular data mining methods applied to the
analysis of cybersecurity alerts was presented in our previous work, in which we discussed the
method selection process [20].
Predicting cyber attacks is an emerging research topic that often builds upon alert correlation [22].
Herein, we summarize the works that used data mining to produce outputs, such as attack models
and predictive rules, that can be used for making predictions. Li et al. [29] and Lei et al. [28]
used data mining to construct attack graphs for attack projection. Li et al. used association rule
mining, while Lei et al. used sequential pattern mining. Farhadi et al. [13] leveraged data mining to
construct a Markov model as a means of attack prediction. Association rule mining was used, and
algorithms were provided. The authors also proposed using stream-based data processing. RTECA
is a framework for early warning based on real-time episode correlation proposed by Ramaki
et al. [34] and one of the few examples of an existing tool. Kim and Park [26] used continuous
association rule mining algorithm to create sequential rules by applying attack threads and attack
sessions to sequential association rules for attack and threat prediction. Recently, Jiang et al. [25]
used association rule mining on honeypot logs to predict suspicious network traffic present in the
honeypots. Simultaneously, attack prediction methods based on machine learning were proposed.
For example, Soska and Christin [39] used machine learning techniques for automated detection of
vulnerable websites before they turn malicious. More recently, Veeramachaneni et al. [44] combined
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Table 1. Summary of related work.
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and even 100 % with 100 items in the blacklist
supervised and unsupervised methods to improve the detection rate of unsupervised methods
alone. Other methods for predicting cyberattacks or cybersecurity situation were discussed in the
survey of attack prediction, projection, and forecasting methods [22].
Predictive blacklisting is a proactive variation to blacklisting that focuses on creating a blacklist
of network entities (e.g., IP addresses and hostnames) that are likely to behave maliciously. First
attempts at predictive blacklisting date back to 2008 in work by Zhang et al. [45], who use data from
DShield to create personalized predictive blacklists using the method of link analysis. Variation of
other methods, such as time series analysis, clustering, and similarity search, was later proposed
by Soldo et al. [38] on the same data, and by Ma et al. [30] on the data from honeypots. Freudiger
et al. [17] proposed another approach that is based on controlled data sharing, using the data
from DShield, and is privacy-preserving. Finally, Melis et al. [32] combined two of the previous
approaches [17, 38], and achieved balance of their strengths and weaknesses, again on DShield
data. Predictive blacklisting is also the desired use case of network entity reputation scoring in the
work of Bartoš et al. [2], who used the data from the SABU alert sharing platform [6] that was also
used in this work. The attention of the researchers in the field is also focused on countermeasure
selection, e.g., as surveyed by Nespoli et al. [33]. Similarly to preceding tasks, a large amount
of heterogeneous data and events calls for research on selecting optimal countermeasures and
development of reaction frameworks that can be combined with Security Information and Event
Management (SIEM), early warning, and prediction systems [35].
3 SABU PLATFORM AND AIDA FRAMEWORK
Our research was motivated by the needs of the SABU alert sharing platform, which we used to
evaluate our proposed approach. We also present AIDA, an analytical framework, that we also
leverage to implement the proposed approach. In this section, we briefly describe the SABU platform
and the AIDA framework, as well as the dataset of alerts obtained from SABU that we used for the
experimentations.
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3.1 SABU Alert Sharing Platform
To illustrate the concepts of security alert sharing in practice, we introduce the SABU alert sharing
platform [6]. The intended scope of its usage is the network of CESNET, Czech national research
and education network, and its partners from academia, public sector, and industry. The purpose of
SABU is to exchange the alerts provided by various IDS, honeypots, and third-party data sources.
The alerts should be received by security teams (CSIRT, CERT) and their incident handlers or by
active network defense devices, such as firewalls that would automatically add network entities in
the alerts on a blacklist. A schematic description of the SABU platform is presented in Figure 1.
A central component of the SABU platform is Warden [5], a hub that receives the alerts from
sending connectors (left) and distributes them to receiving connectors (right). Sending connectors
are various IDS and honeypots. The community around SABU contributes mostly with alerts from
network-based IDS and a variety of low-interaction honeypots [5, 6]. Receiving connectors are
analytical and incident response tools. In the bottom half of the schema, we can see AIDA [19], an





















































Fig. 1. Schema of SABU alert sharing platform and AIDA framework.
SABU uses Intrusion Detection Extensible Alert (IDEA) format [4] for exchanging information
on security events. IDEA is inspired by IDMEF [8], but is customized to reflect operational needs of
network monitoring and incident response community, includes a taxonomy of security events, and
prefers data serialization in JSON. A detailed description and examples of messages in the format
are available on the IDEA website [4]. The most interesting pieces of information are to be found
in Source and Target fields, where we typically find IP addresses of attackers and victims along with
ports and services involved in the event. Node contains the identifiers of the data source, such as
the name of an IDS that sent the alert. Category is a mandatory entry that describes the type of
event, such as network scanning (Recon.Scanning), brute-force password attacks (Attempt.Login),
and exploitation attempt (Attempt.Exploit). DetectTime is a mandatory entry that indicates the time
when the alert was raised, i.e., time of detection. Time of start of a reported event is often hard to
set and, thus, this value is only optional.
3.2 AIDA Framework
AIDA [19, 21] is a modular framework for the stream-based analysis of intrusion detection alerts
using the concepts of big data processing, data mining, and complex event processing. A simplified
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schema of the AIDA framework and its deployment in the SABU platform is depicted in Figure 1.
The framework receives alerts from Warden, the central component of the SABU platform. The
alerts are distributed to processing components of the framework as a data stream using the
Kafka message broker [40]. The data is first processed by three components based on the Apache
Spark [41] framework for stream-based data processing. The first component performs sanitization
and semantic filtering of the data, such as filtering alerts of low interest. The other two components
perform aggregation and data mining, as described in previous works [18, 20, 23]. The mined
rules are stored in a database, where they are accessed by the rule matching component. The rule
matching component is based on Esper [12] and its Event Processing Language (EPL) that allows
for translation of the sequential rules into SQL-like queries over the stream of alerts. If the first
part of the rule is found using the EPL query, the remainder of the rule is predicted and reported as
an alert that is sent back to Warden.
The first application in the processing pipeline is an Alert Aggregation component implemented
as a Spark application. Its task is to find andmark redundant alerts that may slow down and influence
the result of the subsequent operations, especially the data mining process [20]. It processes the
stream of alerts, keeps the vectors of their main features (timestamp, source and target IP addresses,
source and target ports, alert source, and event category) in a predefined time window, and matches
the alerts with similar features according to a set of rules [23]. The first alert with such features is
left untouched; all the others are marked as duplicates of the first alert.
The needs of alert correlation are fulfilled with a Data Mining component. Its purpose is to infer
frequent patterns in the alerts so that the patterns may later be used to predict upcoming security
events. The component consists of the database generator and the rule miner. The generator is
implemented as a Spark application that continuously extracts sequences from the alerts and saves
them to a database. A sequence is a vector of itemsets. In our implementation, an itemset is an
n-tuple consisting of the name of the sensor, alert type, and target port. Formally:
i = (sensor , cateдory,dstport) (1)
The itemsets in a sequence share a common property. In our implementation, the common property
is the source IP address. A sample sequential database with four sequences can be written as:
(ia , ib , ic ), (ia , ib , ic ), (ia , ib , id ), (ix , iy , iz ) (2)
The second part of the Data Mining component is the rule miner, a batch script that is executed
periodically, typically once in a day, when enough sequences are extracted by the stream-based
database generator. The miner uses the SPMF library [14] and mines frequent patterns or rules
from the collected sequences, depending on the selected algorithm. For the purposes of security
event prediction, we chose TopSeqRules, an effective sequential rule mining algorithm [16], to
mine rules that are directly applicable for predictions. Once the mining is completed, the sequential
database is cleared for the next collection period. A sequential rule has the form of:
((ia , ib , ...), (ii , i j , ...), support , conf idence) (3)
where support stands for the frequency of the rule and is defined as the number of sequences
corresponding to the rule and divided by the total number of sequences in the sequential database.
The value of confidence is the percentage of sequences that started with the first part of the rule
and continued with the second part of the rule. This can be interpreted as a probability that the
second part of the rule will follow the first part of the rule. For example, when processing the
sample sequential database in (2), the algorithm would produce rules such as:
((ia , ib ), (ic ), 2/4, 2/3) (4)
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In this example, (ia , ib ) and (ic ) are fragments of a frequent sequence (ia , ib , ic ). This sequence
appeared twice in four sequences and, thus, the support value is 2/4. Three sequences started with
(ia , ib ), but only two ended with (ic ) and, thus, the confidence value is 2/3. Finally, the TopSeqRules
algorithm [16] selects the Top-k rules. Top-k rules are a set of up to k rules, in which each rule
has confidence greater than or equal to minimal confidence and greater support than the rules not
belonging to the set. In the implementation, k is set to 10, and the minimal confidence is set to 0.5.
The final application in the alert processing pipeline is a Rule Matching component that processes
the stream of alerts and queries them for the presence of predefined patterns (sequences) to perform
predictions. This component takes sequential rules from the previous components and converts
them into the queries over the stream of alerts. If the first part of a predictive rule is found in the
stream of alerts, a new alert is generated using the second part of the predictive rule. The component
was implemented as a stand-alone application using Esper, a tool for Complex Event Processing
(CEP) over a stream of data. In addition, the component checks if a predicted event appeared in
the stream of alerts and measures the time gap between the prediction and the predicted event
occurrence. Thus, we may log and measure the precision of predictions and collect feedback on the
predictive rules.
3.3 Dataset
To allow for the reproducibility of the results, we used the dataset [24] of intrusion detection alerts
collected from SABU. The data was collected continuously as they appeared in the SABU platform
for the period of one week, fromMarch 11 to March 17, 2019. Almost 12 million alerts were collected
from 34 network-based IDS, honeypots, and other data sources deployed in 3 distinct organizations:
national research and education network, a large campus network, and a commercial Internet
service provider. The alerts are stored in the IDEA format and categorized using the taxonomy of
security events included in the IDEA definition. The IP addresses in the alerts are anonymized.
4 DATA MINING FOR PREDICTIVE BLACKLISTING
In this section, we provide the description, evaluation, and discussion of an experiment that illus-
trates the use of data mining for predictive cyber situational awareness and predictive blacklisting
in a collaborative environment. First, we describe the setup of the experiment, for which we used
the dataset of alerts from the SABU platform and the AIDA framework. The important features are
settings of the data sanitization, alert aggregation, and the data mining components of the AIDA
framework. Subsequently, we provide the results obtained by processing the dataset. Finally, we
discuss the usability of the outputs, their stability in time, and how to distinguish good results from
others.
4.1 Experiment Setup
First, we split the dataset into seven parts, one part per day, during the dataset collection period.
Subsequently, the first three days were primarily used for the learning phase and mining of the rules.
The remainder of the dataset was used for the evaluation phase. Nevertheless, we also performed
data mining over all seven days to observe the stability of the data mining outputs during the whole
week.
It is important to sanitize the data in the input before processing. In our case, we dismiss the
alerts that are either malformed or not relevant for the given use case. The dataset was revealed
not to contain any malformed alerts. However, there are numerous alerts that are not usable in the
use case of predictive blacklisting. For example, the SABU platform and the dataset contains alerts
of vulnerabilities found on hosts in the network or alerts of phishing attacks. Such alerts do not
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contain the entries required by our proposed data mining approach, most importantly, the source
IP address, and it would be hard to correlate them to the vast majority of the alerts.
An important feature of the experiment is alert aggregation. The task of alert aggregation is one
of the major steps in alert processing [42]. We evaluated the options of alert aggregation in an alert
sharing platform in our previous work [23] and identified four scenarios, in which the alerts may be
aggregated. The two basic types of aggregation that we used in the experiment are the aggregation
of duplicate entries and persisting events. The duplicate entries, i.e., the same alerts that appear in
multiple copies, can be seen in the SABU platform in low numbers (less than 1%) due to errors in
sending and sharing. The alerts demonstrating the continuous malicious activity, however, are a
major concern, as they stand for around one-half of the alerts. Such alerts are raised in response to
long-lasting events by stateless IDS. For example, if a scan of the network takes one hour and the
scan detection method is based on a threshold of packets in the last five minutes, the detection
system raises twelve alerts of the same event, each with a different timestamp. Multiple alerts of a
single long-lasting event skew the results of statistical analysis and data mining. The data mining
over unaggregated data produced sequential patterns and rules that described the continuation of
an event [20]. Although the number of such patterns and rules on the output might be reduced
by certain variants of the mining algorithms, we decided to perform the aggregation first, and
consequently execute the data mining over aggregated alerts to avoid such outputs completely.
Two other scenarios for alert aggregation are alerts of the same event raised by different IDS [23].
Aggregating such alerts might be in conflict with sequence mining because the mined sequences
might correspond to the scenarios for aggregation. We did not include such aggregation in our
experiments. However, similarities in the results of data mining and potential aggregates are
discussed later.
When the data is preprocessed, the remaining task is to select a suitable data mining method that
would produce results of reasonable quality in an acceptable time frame. The sequential pattern
and rule mining were identified as the most suitable methods for the use cases of alert correlation
and attack prediction in our previous work [20]. Briefly, instances in a sequential pattern and
rule mining correspond to the series of actions by the attackers. The actions in the sequences
are sorted in time and, thus, illustrate what the attackers do first, how they proceed, and, in case
of sequential rules, how they are most probably going to take action next. Because we aim at
predictive blacklisting in this paper and not alert correlation, we focus only on sequential rule
mining methods. Out of the possible options [15], we selected the Top-K sequential rule mining
method [16] with K set to 10 and implemented it using the SPMF library [14]. Thus, we obtain the
ten most interesting rules from the dataset. When using plain sequential rule mining, we would
have to set thresholds or select the viable results manually.
For completeness, it is also imperative to briefly highlight alternative approaches. For example,
association rule mining [1] is a viable alternative to sequence mining that illustrates what actions
are adversaries likely to perform simultaneously. However, it does not reflect the timing, which we
believe is a strong contribution of the sequence mining methods. Another alternative is frequent
episode mining [31] that is very similar to sequence mining but does not consider gaps between
events, a condition that would assume and forces the events within an episode not to interleave
with other events.
4.2 Experimental Results
During the experiment, we processed the whole dataset of 12 million alerts. From the average
number of 1.6 million alerts per day, we dismissed around 115 alerts of irrelevant events (reports of
discovered vulnerabilities) and 13,000 alerts without any source IP address. Further, we aggregated
around 2,500 duplicated alerts (0,15 %) and 830,000 persisting alerts (49,61 %).
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Table 2. Mined sequential rules.
Rule Input Output
1 OrgA.tarpit:Recon.Scanning:8000 ⇒ OrgA.tarpit:Recon.Scanning:88
2 OrgA.nemea.hoststats:Recon.Scanning:None ⇒ OrgA.hoststats:Recon.Scanning:None
3 OrgA.tarpit:Recon.Scanning:2323 ⇒ OrgA.tarpit:Recon.Scanning:23

































The rule items are in the form Organization.Sensor:Alert_type.Alert_subtype:Destination_Port.
The experimental results are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 lists the sequential rules
that were mined in the learning phase from the data from the first three days. In total, we mined
sixteen rules during the three days, Top-10 rules from the first day, four new rules in Top-10 rules
on the second day, and two new rules on the third day. The rules are numbered to connect them
with their parameters presented in Table 3. Table 3 lists the values of the parameters of the rules
identified by their number. For each rule, we provide the mean values of support and confidence
and their deviations. The support and confidence values are parameters of the rule produced during
the mining. If a rule was mined multiple times (in multiple days), we calculated the mean values of
particular entries and their deviations.
Further, Table 3 contains the results of the evaluation phase. The successful prediction rate is a
mean value of successful prediction rates in all days, in which the rule was used for predictions.
Min. ∆t and Avg. ∆t stand for minimal and average time differences (in seconds) between prediction
and observation of a predicted event, i.e., its arrival to the analytical framework. In our previous
work [18], we predicted alerts in real time and, thus, were able to use the time in which the
prediction was made. This is not possible when processing the dataset and, thus, we had to alter
the calculation. The time difference is calculated as a difference in timestamps of the last alert in
the first part of the rule and the timestamp of the successfully predicted rule.
An interesting problem occurred during the evaluation, in which, in several cases, the time
difference between the prediction and the predicted event was negative. This might happen in
real-time evaluations, as well. The mandatory timestamp of each alert is the DetectTime, a time
when the event was detected, not when it started. Varying time windows for the detections and the
delays in sending and sharing the alerts cause disordering of the alerts.
Table 4 provides the summary of processed alerts (after sanitization), the number of predictions,
and the prediction success rate per day. The number of predictions is the number of alerts predicted
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Table 3. Parameters of the mined rules.
Rule Support Confidence Success rate Min. ∆t Avg. ∆t Times in Top-10
1 0.0052 ± 0 0.5030 ± 0 (15.89 ± 11.83)% 901 23157 1
2 0.0167 ± 0.0035 0.7800 ± 0.0569 (96.80 ± 0.62)% 1 132 7
3 0.0327 ± 0.0048 0.6043 ± 0.0191 (68.51 ± 1.42)% 901 1669 7
4 0.0044 ± 0.0010 0.5164 ± 0.0139 (21.33 ± 11.60)% 901 21404 3
5 0.0033 ± 0.0006 0.5821 ± 0.0069 (36.85 ± 18.80)% 909 17333 2
6 0.0038 ± 0 0.5765 ± 0 (31.32 ± 18.84)% 901 16694 1
7 0.0047 ± 0.0008 0.7433 ± 0.0940 (97.60 ± 1.02)% 1 749 6
8 0.0038 ± 0 0.5607 ± 0 (27.86 ± 18.77)% 902 18781 1
9 0.0036 ± 0 0.5272 ± 0 (27.01 ± 17.02)% 934 18386 1
10 0.0031 ± 0.0005 0.5408 ± 0.0366 (51.98 ± 10.05)% 279 12191 3
11 0.0039 ± 0.0014 0.6098 ± 0.0547 (57.43 ± 6.35)% 5 8197 5
12 0.0028 ± 0.0002 0.5697 ± 0.0049 (40.00 ± 8.75)% 907 14493 2
13 0.0035 ± 0.0002 0.6438 ± 0.0069 (45.86 ± 3.43)% 901 9389 6
14 0.0039 ± 0.0004 0.5368 ± 0.0244 (84.14 ± 4.78)% 1 4313 3
15 0.0026 ± 0 0.5702 ± 0 (31.08 ± 4.68)% 901 14926 1
16 0.0026 ± 0 0.5623 ± 0 (40.24 ± 3.25)% 901 11925 1





Success rate Reduced data
volume
2019-03-11 1,708,733 51,239 * 31,958 * 62.37 % * 1.87 % *
2019-03-12 1,664,723 46,721 30,322 64.90 % 2.81 %
2019-03-13 1,548,186 53,906 32,899 61.03 % 3.48 %
2019-03-14 1,607,630 45,637 30,039 65.82 % 2.84 %
2019-03-15 1,710,095 47,481 31,234 65.78 % 2.78 %
2019-03-16 1,776,168 53,656 35,735 66.60 % 3.02 %
2019-03-17 1,699,081 50,061 33,325 66.57 % 2.95 %
(* evaluated only with the rules mined from the same day)
using the data from a given day using the rules mined in previous days. The number of successful
predictions is the number of predicted alerts, for which we observed the predicted alert in the data.
The success rate is the ratio of successfully predicted alerts to all predicted alerts. The values are
very similar for every day, fluctuating around 50,000 predictions, 32,000 successful predictions,
and 65 % success rate, except for the first day, which was used only for mining, not for evaluation.
Finally, the last column shows the number of predicted alerts as a percentage of the number of all
processed alerts, which illustrate the data volume reduction.
5 DISCUSSION
Herein, we discuss the results of the experimentation in comparison to our previous work and also
with respect to the novel topic of predictive blacklisting. The major metrics we are interested in
are the prediction accuracy and data volume reduction for predictive blacklisting. Subsequently,
we compare our results with the results of related work. Finally, we delve into the rules to discuss
the features of a “good” rule, i.e., a rule that is suitable for predictive blacklisting.
5.1 Prediction Accuracy
The first major output of our experiment is the evaluation of the success rate of the predictive rules.
The confidence value of the rule can be considered as the expected success rate. However, as we
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can see in Table 3, the success rate can be substantially different (lower) from the confidence values.
This is not necessarily a sign that a rule is bad. Even if we apply the rules mined in one day, we may
still see a success rate that is much lower than the confidence (see the first line in Table 4). The major
reason for this is hidden in the process of generating sequences for sequential rule mining. One
item (alert) may appear in multiple sequences. At the same time, there can be multiple sequences
that share one or more items. The data mining also processes the sequences from the whole, so the
sequences may also be longer than the aggregation window of the aggregation component and,
thus, might add many more sequences to the sequential database. The data mining component
collects all the possible sequences, while the rule matching component uses each item (alert) only
once for each rule to make predictions.
It is worth noting that we have no information in the dataset nor in the SABU platform about
the mitigation actions. Thus, the predictions may be unsuccessful because the malicious actors
were already put on blacklists and filtering rules, which prevented them from proceeding with the
attack. Such a measurement would require collaboration with a number of organizations and their
incident response teams. However, we do not expect this to be a significant factor. Mitigated attacks
would rather decrease the confidence value of the mined rules than decrease the success rate.
5.2 Data Volume Reduction
The second major output is data volume reduction. As we can see in the last column of Table 4, the
volume of predicted alerts is significantly smaller (around 3%) than the volume of alerts on the
input, which is very convenient for the recipients of the data. Using the raw data for blacklisting
and mitigation would be very hard due to the limitations of active network defense appliances
and frequent changes due to the continuous streaming of the data. Thus, by employing predictive
blacklisting, the sharing platform may redistribute only around 50,000 predicted alerts per day,
instead of 1.5 million raw alerts. Although the particular prediction might not be accurate, the
overall success rate of all predicted events is between 61 and 67%. This is also a hit rate of the
blacklist, i.e., a ratio of alerts actually used for mitigating attacks. When using the raw data, the hit
ratio would be around 2 %. Thus, a personalized blacklist is much small in size, yet more actionable
for the needs of network defense. The predicted alerts are proactive, i.e., they contain information
on events that are likely to happen in the near future. In comparison, the raw data is only reactive,
i.e., they refer to actions from the past and do not contain any information about present or future
situations.
We may employ the personalization of the blacklist to further reduce the volume of data. A
particular recipient may wish to receive only the alerts of events that are predicted to happen in
the recipient’s network. The number of alerts for particular recipients could be even lower. In the
experiment, we processed the data from three organizations. However, the organizations did not
contribute equally, and the network of one organization was connected to the Internet via the
backbone network of another organization. The third organization did not have an overlap with
the other two. More information is provided in the dataset description [24]. Due to the network
topology, placement of the IDS, and imbalance between the number of alerts provided by each
organization, most of the rules reflected the activity of an attacker in the backbone network and the
majority of the predicted alerts were predicted to happen in the backbone network as well. Thus,
depending on the circumstances, the personalization of the blacklist might not be balanced well.
The third consideration for the data volume reduction is the number of items in the blacklist
that can be lower than the number of alerts. In the experiment, we projected the activities of
malicious actors identified by the IP address and, thus, the most important item in a predicted
alert is the source IP address. In all stages of alert processing, the number of unique source IP
addresses is approximately one half of the number of alerts. Thus, the blacklist distilled from around
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50,000 alerts would contain around 25,000 unique source IP addresses. Nevertheless, in operational
settings, the predicted alerts are raised continuously, and the blacklist would also be continuously
updated. The actual size of the blacklist would depend on the expiration time of the entries in the
blacklist. If the entries would expire after one day, then the size of the blacklist would correspond
to the number of predicted per day, as summarized in Table 4. When employing the knowledge on
time differences between prediction and predicted event, we may set the expiration accordingly so
that the item would expire sooner, and the continuous size of the blacklist would be even smaller.
However, this should be evaluated in an operational setting.
5.3 Comparison to Previous Results
The results are mostly similar to our previous measurements in the live environment, namely
in numbers of dismissed and aggregated alerts on the input [23] and the predictive rules on the
output [18]. The major difference is the stability of the rules in time, as presented in our previous
work [18], where we observed eight rules out of ten to be mined every day while displaying similar
values of support and confidence. In our new experiment, we observed only two rules that appeared
in Top-10 mined rules in all seven days. We mined three rules on the first day and two rules on
the third day that did not appear in the outputs anymore. Nevertheless, the remainder of the rules
appear at least three times in the outputs, and their values of support and confidence are very
similar in all cases. The first experiment and the dataset collection were more than one year apart
and, thus, the composition of the data sources and alerts have changed. Long-term monitoring
would be more helpful, but we may still assume that the majority of the rules are stable in the short
term.
It is also possible to compare our results to the result from related work on predictive blacklisting.
The success rate of the prediction is, in essence, the same metric as the hit rate that is used in
previous works on predictive blacklisting. The hit rate is the number of hits divided by the size
of the blacklist, where the hit is the observation of malicious actions by an entity on the blacklist.
Similarly, the hit count is corresponding to the number of successful predictions. Previous results
show median hit rates in various experiments under 20% [30, 45]. Further works improved the
hit counts but did not discuss the hit rates [17, 32, 38]. The highest hit rates were achieved by
Bartoš et al. [2], but the hit rate degrades with the size of the blacklist, as presented in Table 1. The
success rate of around 65% in our work outperforms previous works even with large blacklists.
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that predictions illustrated in this work apply in the
short term (seconds to hours), while previous works often use longer time spans (hours to days
and more).
5.4 Selection and Usability of Rules
The final point of discussion is the variety of rules and the differences in their features and usability.
The data mining method we used is very convenient; it is fully automated and does not require
a training phase or supervision by a human expert. Still, the rules on the outputs are not perfect.
Increasing the quality of the input data has a major impact on the quality of the results and, thus,
we employed data sanitization and alert aggregation [20, 23]. The SABU platform is further limited
by a low variety of alerts due to the fact that most of the data sources are network-based IDS and
honeypots that all detect similar events, such as network scanning, brute-force password attack,
and exploitations. There are not many finely-grained alerts of particular phases of such events or
continuations of the attack observed by host-based IDS.
We identified several features of a good rule that should pave the way for future work. The
AIDA framework allows us to manually activate and deactivate what the operator considers as
good or bad. Understanding and formalizing the features of a good rule would allow for proper and
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even automated selection. The first two features, support and confidence values, are set during
data mining and clear to understand. The higher the confidence, the better. Low support would
indicate a rare sequence, but otherwise is not that important. Another feature of a good rule is its
stability in time. If a rule is mined several days in a row with similar support and confidence values,
we consider as good. Otherwise, it would suggest an anomaly in the input data. Another feature
is the success rate that also needs prolonged evaluations in cooperation with the rule matching
component of the AIDA framework. These four features are exact and can be formulated into
thresholds if needed.
There are two more features of a good rule that are not clear from the values but require an
expert or operator’s insight. The first would be the rule that overlaps with one of the scenarios for
alert aggregation, specifically the detection of the same event by different sensors from different
(non-overlapping) networks [23]. Large-scale network scanning is a prime example of such an
event. Such a rule would actually be good because it illustrates how the attack spreads over the
networks. The value of such a rule is in predicting the next target of the malicious activity, even
if it is the same action that the attacker has used before. The second model situation would be a
rule that is not necessarily a sequential rule, but rather an association rule in disguise. We can
see such rules frequently as combinations of ports scanned by the attackers. For example, rule 3
in Table 2 suggests that a scanner that scans for port 2323 will also scan for port 23. In practice,
however, scanners frequently scan port 23 for open Telnet ports and might also scan port 2323 as its
alternative binding. The scans are very frequent so the data mining component observes sequences
in both direction, 23 => 2332 and 2323 => 23. While both sequences are frequent, the scans of port
2323 are rarer than scans of port 23 and, thus, the rule 2323 => 23 has higher confidence and higher
chance to appear in Top-K rules. Association rule mining would find a strong association between
the two events, which would be good, but for sequential rules that take timing into account, this
would not be a good rule.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented an approach to creating predictive blacklists from shared intrusion
detection alerts using the methods of data mining and predictions of cyberattacks. We briefly
described the alert sharing platform, fromwhich we obtained the data, and the analytical framework
that was used for data processing. The data was anonymized and made publicly available from [24],
to widely support research reproducibility and auxiliary experimentation by the relevant research
communities.
Using the methods of sequential rule mining, we were able to mine predictive rules from the
data and use them to predict upcoming cybersecurity events. Over 60 % of the predicted alerts
were observed to occur and, thus, may be used to create a predictive blacklist of IP addresses
that are likely to act maliciously. From a more practical perspective, the predictive blacklist is
significantly smaller in volume than the raw data. This fact is important for recipients of the shared
data that could otherwise be overwhelmed by the volume of raw data that is hard to process
and mostly irrelevant. In this context, the proposed approach provides a smaller volume of data
with higher usability. In a production deployment of the SABU alert sharing platform, the AIDA
framework uploads the predicted alerts to the sharing platform, and the data consumers may access
the predicted alerts and create their own blacklists.
We believe there are many opportunities for future work. First, we identified a set of features
of a good rule, i.e., a sequential rule that is most likely going to predict relevant events and leave
enough time for response and mitigation. Formalizing the features of a good rule would allow
us to create a set of filters or thresholds that would select the most suitable rules. Alternatively,
we may train a machine learning algorithm, such as a decision tree, to automatically select the
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good rules. Second, we would like to continue the measurements in the operational environment
and focus on predictive blacklist generation and its usage at the receiving organizations. It would
also be imperative to measure the size of a predictive blacklist and its success rate in cyber attack
mitigation per organization, hence, providing empirical evidence and measurements of the benefits
of information sharing. Although this work mainly involves network security and incident response,
we believe that our work may be used in other fields as well. For example, data mining experts may
use our results from a specific domain and generalize and optimize them. Machine learning experts
may follow the ideas outlined in the discussion on the automated selection of good rules. Further,
our work may support future research in threat intelligence and alert correlation by identifying
subsets of alerts that are perspective for particular analyses.
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